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Apple Inc. v. Pepper: The Future of Software-Based 




Apple Inc. uses the iOS App Store as a retail space for smartphone application 
developers to sell their iPhone applications.1 The application developers set their 
price and pay Apple Inc. a thirty-percent commission for each application that is sold 
on the platform.2 In 2011, four iPhone users filed a putative antitrust class action 
complaint against Apple Inc. (hereafter, “Apple”), alleging that they paid 
uncompetitively high prices when purchasing iPhone Applications (hereafter, 
“apps”).3 In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,4 the Supreme Court considered whether iPhone 
users who purchased apps through Apple’s iOS App Store (hereafter “the App 
Store”) are direct purchasers of Apple and are therefore proper plaintiffs to sue Apple 
for allegedly monopolizing the iPhone app market.5  
Since the late nineteenth century, Congress has restricted monopolistic behavior, 
and the Supreme Court has contextualized the scope and limitations of those 
legislative restrictions.6 The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolistic behavior,7 
and the Clayton Antitrust Act provides an avenue for injured persons to sue to 
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1. Julia Alexander, A Guide to Platform Fees, THE VERGE (Sep. 22, 2020, 8:05 AM EDT), 
https://www.theverge.com/21445923/platform-fees-apps-games-business-marketplace-apple-google. 
 2. Id. 
 3. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
2, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 
(2019). 
 4. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019). 
 5. Id. at 1519-20. 
 6. See Section II.A-C. 
 7. Chapter 647, 51 Congress. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.SC. §§ 1-7. 
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recover injuries stemming from monopolistic behavior.8 In 1976, the Supreme Court 
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois9 affirmed prior Court precedent that limited the scope 
of a proper plaintiff in antitrust suits to direct purchasers from alleged monopolists.10 
Pass-on theories of liability are not proper antitrust suits under Illinois Brick.11 The 
majority in Apple Inc. v. Pepper12 determined that the iPhone users are direct 
purchasers of Apple and may sue Apple for alleged antitrust violations.13  
This comment argues that the Court in Apple ultimately erred in its application of 
Illinois Brick to the facts.14 Further, the Court misapplied established precedential 
theories of proximate cause to antitrust standing.15 Consequently, the Court failed to 
consider its design’s reaching effect on the future of online retail markets.16 
I. The Case 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,17 the Supreme Court addressed whether the Ninth Circuit 
properly determined that iPhone users have standing to sue Apple under the Clayton 
Antitrust Act.18 In Pepper v. Apple Inc. (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation),19 
four iPhone owners sued Apple in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, alleging monopolistic practices.20 As observed by the Ninth 
Circuit, the iPhone users alleged that Apple’s practice of charging independent 
iPhone app developers a thirty-percent commission directly caused app developers 
to charge uncompetitively high prices for their apps.21 Apple had moved to dismiss, 
arguing that iPhone owners were not direct consumers of Apple vis-à-vis their 
purchase of iPhone apps and thus lacked standing to sue Apple under the Clayton 
Antitrust Act.22 Apple claimed that if its alleged monopolistic practices harm anyone, 
 
 8. Chapter 323, 63 Congress. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53. 
 9. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 10. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977). 
 11. In a pass-on theory, alleged illegal overcharges are passed along the chain of distribution to a third-party, 
who then sues for antitrust injury. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726 (“In general a pass-on theory may not be used 
defensively” or “offensively by an indirect purchaser.”). 
 12. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 13. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1519. 
 14. See infra Section IV.A. 
 15. See infra Section IV.B. 
 16. See infra Section IV.C. 
 17. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 18. Id. at 1519. 
 19. No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 846 
F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Pepper v. Apple Inc. (In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.), 846 F.3d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 22. Id. 
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they harm the app developers, not the iPhone users, thereby limiting the scope of 
proper plaintiffs to only app developers, excluding app purchasers.23 The district 
court agreed and granted Apple’s motion to dismiss.24  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that iPhone 
users are direct purchasers because the iPhone users purchase apps from Apple, 
which then pays the app developers (less the contracted commission price).25 The 
Ninth Circuit relied on Illinois Brick,26 where the Court held that a plaintiff must be 
a direct purchaser from an alleged antitrust violator to sue for damages under section 
four of the Clayton Act.27 The Ninth Circuit considered whether the iPhone users 
purchased apps either directly from Apple, which operated the App Store, or the app 
developers, who set the price for and sell their apps in the App Store.28 The Ninth 
Circuit identified Apple as a distributor of iPhone apps, selling them directly to 
purchasers through its App Store.29 Accordingly, because Apple is a direct distributor 
under this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs have standing 
under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing the sale of iPhone 
apps.30  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
consumers who brought suit were proper plaintiffs under the Clayton Antitrust Act.31 
In its decision, the Court focused specifically on whether they purchased iPhone apps 
directly from Apple. 32  
II. Legal Background 
In response to the pervasive anticompetitive practices of major industrial 
corporations, Congress passed the Sherman Act33 in 1890 as a “comprehensive 
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as 
the rule of trade.”34 In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws: the 
 
 23. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 323 (summarizing Apple’s contention that it does 
not sell apps, but rather sells software distribution services to App developers, analogizing its position to a  
“shopping mall owner” that “leases physical spaces to various store”). 
 24. No. 11-CV-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013). 
 25. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 320. 
 26. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (allowing the recovery of damages by “any person injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”). 
 28. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 315. 
 29. Id. at 322. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 139 S. Ct. at 1514. 
 32. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018). 
 33. Chapter 647, 51 Congress. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
 34. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
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Federal Trade Commission Act35 and the Clayton Act.36 The addition of the Clayton 
Act to the United States antitrust law provides inter alia a pathway for persons 
injured by competitive practices to recover damages.37 Over the subsequent decades, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clayton Act’s implications on varying classes 
of potential litigants seeking recovery for damages stemming from alleged 
anticompetitive behavior.38 Section II.A describes the initial passing and scope of the 
Sherman Act.39 Next, Section II.B describes the passing and scope of the Clayton 
Antitrust Act.40 Finally, Section II.C examines key treatment of the antitrust laws by 
the Supreme Court regarding standing and damages.41 
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act42 in 1890, codifying restrictions on 
anticompetitive and anti-interstate commercial activities in the marketplace.43 The 
Sherman Antitrust Act makes unlawful any practice determined to “monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations.”44 Section One of the Act states that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”45 Section Two of the Act makes a felony of the monopolization of interstate 
commercial activity.46 For many activities, the Sherman Act prohibits only 
objectively unreasonable behavior.47 The Act does, however, enumerate per se 
violations, including “plain arrangements among competing individuals” and 
“businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids.”48 The Sherman Antitrust Act’s 
passing was unprecedented legislation that provided civil (and limited criminal) 
 
 35. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2021). 
 36. 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
 38. See infra Section II.C. 
 39. See infra Section II.A. 
 40. See infra Section II.B. 
 41. See infra Section II.C. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
 43. See generally id. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2021). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2021). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
 48. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2021). 
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enforcement against certain free-market enterprises deemed harmful to specific 
consumers.49 
B. The Clayton Act 
In 1914, Congress supplemented previous antitrust legislation with the passing of 
the Clayton Antitrust Act.50 The Clayton Act’s passing addressed monopolistic 
activities not regulated in the Sherman Antitrust Act, such as mergers and 
interlocking directorates.51 The Act outlines “treble damages” for injuries caused by 
activities in violation of the statute, meaning actual damages that are equivalent to 
three times the amount of injury that the injured party has suffered.52 The Act 
clarified the type of injury for which people may sue for an antitrust violation as 
“[t]he diminishment of a person’s property by a payment of money wrongfully 
induced.”53 Generally, when a court determines damages are due and owed for an 
injury stemming from anticompetitive activity, courts will triple the difference 
between the price paid and the market price.54  
C. Key Treatment of Antitrust Law by the Supreme Court 
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,55 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether plaintiffs “passing on damages” sustained by paying 
uncompetitive prices by collecting that amount from their customers prevented their 
recovering damages.56 The Court applied the longstanding jurisprudential theory of 
proximate cause to suits where parties are injured by antitrust violations, noting the 
“general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the 
first step.”57 Southern Pacific set off a wave of Supreme Court cases establishing an 
apparent super-precedent restricting antitrust cases to only those where damages are 
not passed-on to Plaintiffs.58 
In Hanover Shoe v. United Machinery Corp.,59 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and 
defined the rule of proximate cause as applied to those injured by antitrust 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. 
 51. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2021) (explaining that interlocking directorates 
means the same person making business decisions for competing companies). 
 52. 15 U.S.C § 15. 
 53. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). 
 54. See id. at 396. 
 55. 245 U.S. 531 (1918). 
 56. S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text. 
 59. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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violations.60 In Hanover Shoe, the Plaintiff, a manufacturer of shoes, brought a treble 
damage antitrust action alleging injury from the Defendant’s monopolistic shoe 
machinery market.61 The Court agreed with the Defendant’s assertion that the 
Plaintiff, having “passed-on” the alleged illegal overcharge as reflected in its own 
conflated shoe prices, suffered no cognizable injury.62 The Court’s ruling went on to 
prohibit antitrust violators from using a “pass-on theory” defensively.63 The Court 
reasoned that permitting pass-on theories in calculating damages would “involv[e] 
massive evidence and complicated theories,” unduly and unnecessarily burdening 
the judicial system.64 
Ten years later, in Illinois Brick,65 the Supreme Court applied a similar rule to 
antitrust plaintiffs, declining to “permit offensive use of a pass-on theory against an 
alleged violator.”66 The Court described the similar complication that would arise in 
calculating damages as recognized previously in Hanover Shoe.67 Further, allowing 
pass-on theories would allow “plaintiffs at each level in the distribution chain” to 
“assert conflicting claims to a common fund,” which would require “massive efforts 
to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part 
of the overcharge—from direct purchasers to middlemen, to ultimate consumers.”68 
Permitting pass-on theories in this way requires courts to determine the amount of 
monopolized charges that were absorbed by intermediary purchasers and how much 
those purchasers were able to pass on to customers down the distribution chain ad 
infinitum.69 To mitigate these potential complications, the Court established the 
bright-line rule of antitrust standing, where only direct purchasers from an alleged 
antitrust violator may sue under Section Four of the Clayton Act.70  
 
 60. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 490 (1968). 
 61. Id. at 483. 
 62. See id. at 487-89 (holding that only where a buyer claiming injury under antitrust law, “in the face of 
the overcharge . . . does nothing ad absorbs the loss, he [is] entitled to treble damages”). 
 63. Id. at 513. 
 64. Id. at 493. 
 65. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 66. Id. at 735 (emphasis added). 
 67. See id. at 725 (rejecting indirect purchasers as proper plaintiffs due to “an unwillingness to complicate 
treble-damage actions with attempts to trace the effects of the overcharge on the purchaser’s prices, sales, costs, 
and profits, and of showing that these variables would behave differently without the overcharge”). 
 68. Id. at 737. 
 69. Id. at 757. 
 70. Id. at 726. 
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III. The Court’s Reasoning 
Writing for the majority in Apple Inc. v. Pepper,71 Justice Kavanaugh upheld the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, holding that the iPhone owners are direct consumers of Apple 
and therefore have standing to bring an antitrust suit.72 Relying on the language in 
the antitrust legislation and Supreme Court precedent, the Court reasoned that the 
iPhone users purchased the apps directly from Apple.73 Accordingly, under Illinois 
Brick,74 the iPhone users were direct consumers who may sue Apple for alleged 
monopolization.75 Ultimately, Justice Kavanaugh relied on the specific and direct 
contractual relationship between the two parties, reading Illinois Brick to permit a 
plaintiff that maintains a direct purchaser relationship with a retailer to sue that 
retailer for antitrust damages.76 
The majority opinion first relied on the relevant statutory text:77 Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits monopolization,78 and Section 4 of the 
Clayton Antitrust Act, which provides judicial remedy for persons injured by an 
antitrust violator.79 Applying Section 4 of the Clayton Act to the Court’s decision in 
Illinois Brick, immediate buyers from alleged antitrust violators may sue, and 
indirect buyers may not sue.80 Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that where no 
intermediary stands in the distribution chain between Apple and the app purchaser, 
who pays Apple directly, the purchasers are direct consumers under Illinois Brick.81 
The dispositive question for the majority was whether or not a direct contract exists 
between the parties.82 According to the majority, such a contract exists in this case.83  
 
 71. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 72. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1525. 
 73. Id. at 1520. 
 74. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 75. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1520. 
 76. Id. at 1525 (2019) (recasting Illinois Brick as a rule forbidding only suits where the Plaintiff lacks 
contractual privity with the defendant, regardless of who sets the price). 
 77. Id. at 1520. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) makes it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations.” 
 79. 15 U.S.C § 15(a) (2017) states that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . the defendant . . . and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 
 80. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1523. 
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The Court then outlined three problems with Apple’s argument that Illinois Brick 
only allows consumers to sue the party who sets the retail price.84 First, the “who sets 
the price” theory contradicts legislative intent.85 According to Justice Kavanaugh, 
the Sherman Act was intended to be read broadly to accomplish the goal of 
countering antitrust violations, and the Court should therefore apply that goal broadly 
in its interpretation of Illinois Brick.86 The legal technicalities Apple raises, he 
argued, should not interfere with this goal.87 Second, Apple’s theory draws arbitrary 
lines among retailers and manufacturers based on particular financial arrangements 
on price setting.88 Third, the implications of adopting Apple’s theory directs 
corporations to structure their contracts in such a way to make sure they are not 
setting the prices and thereby avoiding the reach of antitrust law on a technicality.89   
The four-Justice dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch, considered the majority 
opinion to misapply Illinois Brick’s90 rejection of pass-on theories of liability.91 
Given that the plaintiffs purchased the apps from third-party app developers, the 
developers are the parties directly injured by any alleged monopolization.92 The 
iPhone users are only harmed if the app developers choose to pass-on the overcharge 
to the app purchasers.93 The dissent additionally considers the majority rule as 
overcomplicating the calculation of damages,94 a problem specifically addressed in 
the reasoning in Illinois Brick.95 Suppose it is said, as the majority does, that the 
dispositive question is whether or not a direct contract exists. In that case, Apple can 
structure its relationship with iPhone users so the app purchasers are outside of direct 
contract with Apple.96 Apple could easily develop a system wherein app purchasers 
pay money directly to the developer, who then pays Apple its thirty-percent 
 
 84. See id. (stating that Apple’s “who sets the price theory” relies on an interpretation of Illinois Brick as 
allowing consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the goods or 
services directly to the complaining party, rather than the party who merely provides a retail space and charges a 
commission for the sellers). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1525 (Gorsuch, J., Dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 1528. 
 92. Id. at 1529. 
 93. Id. at 1525. 
 94. Id. at 1529. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1530 (Gorsuch, J., Dissenting). 
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commission.97 Ultimately, the dissent implies that the majority opinion injudiciously 
rejects cogent and established jurisprudential theories of proximate cause.98 
IV. Analysis 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,99 the Supreme Court held that consumers who purchase 
goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices in an allegedly monopolistic 
retailer’s store may sue the retailer under antitrust law.100 Specifically, the Court held 
that the plaintiff iPhone owners, who purchased apps through Apple’s App Store, are 
direct purchasers under Illinois Brick and may thus sue Apple.101 The Court’s 
judgment was incorrectly decided because the holding misapplied the precedential 
reasoning of Illinois Brick, which sought to prohibit the very type of suit presented 
in this case.102 In addition to misapplying precedent, the Court engaged in circular 
reasoning in its effort to assert an overly broad statutory interpretation, effectuating 
incalculable damages for this case and future like-cases.103 Finally, the Court’s 
decision ignores the direction of technological process of software-based retail 
spaces and creates overly complicated, repetitive, and ineffectual procedures for an 
injured party to obtain damages.104 
A. The Court’s Holding is Incorrect Because it Misapplied Precedent Established 
in Illinois Brick 
The majority opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper105 interpreted its 1977 ruling in 
Illinois Brick to prohibit suits only where a plaintiff does not contract directly with 
the defendant.106 Because the iPhone users in this case did have contractual privity 
with Apple through the App Store, the majority held that Illinois Brick makes the 
iPhone users proper plaintiffs to sue Apple for antitrust violations. The critical 
holding in Illinois Brick was the Court’s rejection of “pass-on” theories of 
damages—the notion that an antitrust plaintiff cannot sue a defendant for 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that “under ancient rules of proximate 
causation, the ‘general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first 
step’” (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U. S. at 490), and concluding that app purchasers are separated from Apple 
by the app developers). 
 99. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 100. Id. at 1525. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See infra Section IV.A. 
 103. See infra Section IV.B. 
 104. See infra Section IV.C. 
 105. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 106. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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overcharging someone else who might have passed on some amount of overcharge 
to them.  
The case at hand is precisely the type of “pass-on” damages case that Illinois Brick 
prohibits.107 The Plaintiffs in this case purchased apps from third-party app 
developers in Apple’s retail store.108 The app prices are set by the app developers, 
who then pay Apple a thirty-percent commission for every app sold.109 The first tier 
of damages from alleged monopolistic behavior is, therefore, suffered by the app 
developers, who may choose, or not choose, to pass on the monopolistic overcharge 
to the iPhone users.110 According to Illinois Brick, only purchasers connected by a 
single link in the distribution chain may sue.111 The Court’s ruling rested on the 
undue burden and overcomplication caused by permitting parties not directly 
connected on the chain of distribution to sue non-proximate distributors. Permitting 
consumers to sue retailers for damages passed-on to consumers requires 
“determining how much of the manufacturer’s monopoly rent was absorbed by an 
intermediary… and how much they were able and chose to pass on to their 
customers.”112 Further, calculating passed-on damages requires “complicated 
theories” about “how the relevant market variables would have behaved had there 
been no overcharge.”113 Such a calculation is not only incredibly complex, requiring 
massive evidence and calculation, but in many cases, nearly impossible.114 
Apple requires the price of all apps in the App Store to end in ninety-nine cents, 
and the vast majority of apps in the App Store are only ninety-nine cents.115 As the 
dissent notes, a developer charging ninety-nine cents cannot raise its price in line 
with the thirty-cent commission it owes to Apple..116 So to recover any purported 
losses, App developers would have to increase their apps’ price by over one-hundred 
 
 107. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 750 (holding that a consumer separated from a manufacturer in a distribution chain 
by a third-party may not engage in an antitrust suit where the third-party passes on higher-than-competitive prices 
to the consumer); Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1526 (holding that iPhone app purchasers may sue Apple, despite 
being separated in the chain of distribution by app developers, who allegedly pass on higher-than-competitive 
prices to consumers). 
 108. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text. 
 109. Julia Alexander, A Guide to Platform Fees, THE VERGE (Sep. 22, 2020, 8:05 AM EDT), 
https://www.theverge.com/21445923/platform-fees-apps-games-business-marketplace-apple-google. 
 110. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735. 
 113. Id. at 741-43. 
 114. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 115. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. 
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percent to recover the thirty percent owed to Apple.117 This illustration serves to 
demonstrate the complexities of calculating passed-on damages, being the very 
reason the Court in Illinois Brick forbade them.118 The majority opinion claims that 
there is no intermediary between Apple and the iPhone users and that the absence of 
an intermediary is dispositive119—a misapprehension of the actual chain of 
distribution.120 Apple and the app purchasers are separated in the distribution chain 
by the app developers who set their own prices.121 The majority goes on, claiming to 
not “understand the relevance of the upstream market structure in deciding whether 
a downstream consumer may sue a monopolistic retailer.”122 The relevance the 
majority seeks stems directly from Illinois Brick’s clear stance on such market 
structures.123 If by nothing more than precedent, being “two or more” steps removed, 
a downstream consumer cannot retain a proper antitrust suit against an upstream 
retailer.124 In this case, the app purchasers are two steps removed from Apple. The 
intermediary is the app developers who may either absorb or pass-on any due or 
undue expenses imposed by Apple.125 
B. The Court Applied Circular Reasoning in its Statutory Interpretation of 
Proximate Cause in Antitrust Law 
Apple pushed a “price-setting theory”—one that interprets Illinois Brick as 
allowing consumers to sue only the party that sets the retail price, regardless of 
whether that party operates the retail space where the goods are sold.126 The majority 
purports that Apple’s theory provides a “roadmap for monopolistic retailers to 
structure transactions with manufacturers or suppliers so as to evade antitrust claims 
by consumers. “127 The majority considers a system of standing based on price setting 
as problematic because Apple, knowing this, is fully incentivized to alter its contracts 
 
 117. Id. (“[A] developer charging $0.99 for its app can’t raise its price by just enough to recover the 30-cent 
commission. Instead, if the developer wants to pass on the commission to consumers, it has to more than double 
its price to $1.99 (doubling the commission in the process), which could significantly affect its sales.”). 
 118. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732 (noting that “the attempt to trace the complex economic adjustments to a 
change in the cost of a particular factor of production would greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of 
already protracted treble-damages proceedings applies . . . [to] pass-on theories . . . .”). 
 119. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that the dispositive intermediary is the app 
developers). 
 121. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 122. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1523. 
 123. See generally Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. 720 (explicitly forbidding downstream consumers from suing an 
alleged monopolistic retailer upstream the distribution chain). 
 124. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732. 
 125. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1523. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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in such a way as to evade antitrust laws—namely, have the funds from an app 
purchase go first to the developer, who then pays Apple its thirty percent 
commission, rather than vice versa, as is the current system.128 
While relevant, this concern does not actually support the conclusion of the 
majority and, in fact, results in the exact outcome the Court rejects.129 For the 
majority, Illinois Brick prioritizes contractual privity relationships between the 
parties as a basis for antitrust standing.130 The decision here gives just as much 
direction to retailers like Apple to structure their relationships in such a way as to 
avoid antitrust laws.131 For example, Apple now is incentivized, and arguably 
instructed, to structure its relationship with app purchasers so the direct contractual 
privity is first between the app developers and the app purchasers, who then remit 
the thirty percent back to Apple.132 This technical contractual shift effectively 
removes retailers from antitrust liability.133  
The outcome in this case therefore fails to incentivize online console retailers to 
alter any allegedly monopolistic behavior at all, but rather to merely alter their 
contractual relationships.134 The majority’s concern is tautological in that both an 
affirmation or reversal of the Court of Appeals ruling provides direction to alleged 
monopolists to restructure their contractual privity to appear to comply with the 
Court’s ruling while actually evading antitrust liability.135 
Further, the hypothetical offered by the Court in contention with the “who sets the 
price theory” has little basis in reality.136 Consider the following hypothetical offered 
by Justice Kavanaugh:137  
In a traditional markup pricing model, a hypothetical monopolistic 
retailer might pay $6 to the manufacturer and then sell the product for 
$10, keeping $4 for itself. In a commission pricing model, the retailer 
might pay nothing to the manufacturer; agree with the manufacturer that 
the retailer will sell the product for $10 and keep 40 percent of the sales 
price; and then sell the product for $10, send $6 back to the manufacturer, 
 
 128. Id. at 1523-24. 
 129. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text. 
 130. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1521-23. 
 131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 133. As the majority opinion in Apple Inc. rests antitrust standing on contractual privity, retailers like Apple 
now know to structure their business relationships with app purchasers in such a way that mitigates contractual 
privity. 
 134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text. 
 136. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
 137. Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522. 
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and keep $4. In those two different pricing scenarios, everything turns out 
to be economically the same for the manufacturer, retailer, and 
consumer.138 
While it is true that the end result is the same, in each case the actual actor is in 
fact different.139 If the retailer setting the ten-dollar price is a monopolist, then they 
are the party committing the legal violation.140 In reality, a practice where a 
manufacturer sets the price, while at the same time the retailer is acting with 
monopolistic power, is practically non-existent.141 Consider a hypothetical where 
there is a monopolistic retailer that has to take from the manufacturer the price that 
it is going to sell at in the open market. This situation is so tenuously related to actual 
business practice, that the hypothetical itself is at most purely academic.142 This 
tenuous connection serves to strengthen the notion that the price setter is the party 
who may or may not act monopolistically, because those situations are commonplace 
in real business relationships.143 In this case, and in many antitrust cases, the plaintiffs 
claim injury stemming from paying uncompetitively high prices.144 The nature of the 
contract between the iPhone users and Apple is nowhere presented by the plaintiffs 
as the basis for the alleged uncompetitively high prices.145 Therefore, the price-setter 
is the most direct link to the plaintiffs’ damages, and antitrust standing ought to be 
recognized only in a suit against the price-setter.146 
Consider two popular online retailers: the Epic Game Store, which takes a twelve-
percent commission on games sold, and Steam, which takes a thirty-percent cut on 
the PC marketplace.147 Some developers have moved their games over to the Epic 
Game Store and have sold at the same retail price that they sold on Steam, suggesting 
that removing that commission will not affect the prices set by the developers.148 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See supra Section II.C (providing key treatment of antitrust standing cases, in each case limiting standing 
to the price setter). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (noting that the plaintiffs claimed 
injuries stem from allegedly paying uncompetitively high prices for Apps); Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1528 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that developers set the price of their apps, not Apple). 
 146. Id. 
 147. JONATHAN BORCK ET AL., APPLE’S APP STORE AND OTHER DIGITAL MARKETPLACES 6 (2020), 
https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketpl
aces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf. 
 148. Kyle Orland, Should PC Games Cost Less On Epic’s Game Store?, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:49 
PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/01/should-pc-games-cost-less-on-epics-games-store/ (noting the first 
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After all, developers understand the supply and demand curves for their products 
better than retail store owners.149 By this example, the developers model their prices 
individually, and do not model their prices based on the particular retail space they 
are selling.150 Notably, Apple’s thirty-percent commission generally coincides with 
the market value for other predominant online retailers.151 
A system where a retailer sets the price for a manufacturer cuts against the notion 
that the manufacturer is a monopolistic actor at all.152 A retailer’s monopolistic power 
stems directly from its ability to set a price.153 A system that limits the scope of a 
“direct purchaser” to one with contractual privity incentivizes manufacturers to 
restructure their contracts to avoid antitrust laws.154 Further, restricting the price 
setter from antitrust liability ignores actual market practice, in particular, the 
effective enforcement of antitrust laws.155 
C. The Court’s Decision Obfuscates Antitrust Standing in the Growing Field of 
Console Retail Stores 
The impact of the Court’s decision in this case has far-reaching implication on the 
expanding market of software-based console retailers,156 most notably with online 
gaming stores.157 The effect of the Court’s decision limits the ability of a developer 
of a piece of software to set the prices of its own software because of the risk of 
antitrust accusations of direct contractual privity. Platforms like Apple’s App store 
are growing exponentially in popularity.158 Software-based online applications that 
operate as retail stores for smartphone and computer apps like Steam and Epic Games 
 
case of a reduced price following a commission reduction, suggesting the price for the majority of games sold on 
Steam and Epic Games are relatively similar). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (inferring how developers model prices from the disparate commission models between Steam and 
Epic Games, while game prices are similar on both platforms). 
 151. BORCK, supra note 147. 
 152. See supra notes 142; 145. 
 153. Section 4 of the Clayton Act’s broad text stipulates recovery of damages by consumers who purchase 
goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices. See infra note 8. It follows that the party who sets the price 
has the power to set that price at a rate higher than free-market forces permit. 
 154. See supra note 133. 
 155. See supra notes 145-149. 
 156. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE, 
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-court-
loss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast. 
 157. Id. 
 158. The Global Gaming Industry Takes Centre Stage, MORGAN STANLEY (Aug. 26, 2020), 
https://www.morganstanley.com.au/ideas/the-global-gaming-industry. 
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are just two examples of the growing market, both of which charge commission to 
software game developers to sell on their platforms.159 
The Court’s ruling now incentives the large retailers, concerned that granting 
price-setting freedom to developers exposes it to unnecessary liability, to restrict the 
ability of a software developer to price control access to that software, effectively 
reducing the market power of the developers.160 The effect of an exacerbated power-
imbalance has the potential to decrease competitiveness in the software-based 
gaming space, as power is taken from smaller, more vulnerable developers, and 
accumulated by the owners of the retail space, like Apple.161 This is a counterintuitive 
consequence of an apparent antitrust case.162 The Court’s ruling now exposes these 
types of retailers to unintended liability—as multiple parties along the distribution 
chain, the developers and the gamers, now have ostensible standing to sue if they 
find that commission access unreasonable.163 
V. Conclusion 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,164 the Supreme Court held that under Illinois Brick, 
iPhone users who purchased apps in the Apple App Store, with prices set by third-
party developers, are direct purchasers of Apple and thus proper plaintiffs to bring 
an antitrust suit against Apple.165 The Court erred in its interpretation of the precedent 
established in Illinois Brick because Apple and iPhone users are separated in the 
chain of distribution by app developers.166 In finding iPhone users and Apple to be 
directly linked in the chain of distribution, the Court ignored theories of proximate 
 
 159. Michael Andonico, You Don’t Need a PS5 or Xbox Series X Right Now—Here’s Why, CNN, (Dec. 9, 
2020, 3:12 PM EST), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/09/cnn-underscored/alternatives-ps5-xbox-series-
x/index.html. 
 160. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE, 
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-court-
loss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast. 
 161. Apple retains hegemonic status in the power balance it maintains with app developers and is incentivized 
to restrict app developers’ ability to price control, given that now all antitrust liability is concentrated with Apple. 
See John Swartz, Apple vs. Epic: Why Cloud Gaming Became a Hot Topic at Landmark Antitrust Trial, 
MARKETWATCH, (May 8, 2021, 10:54a.m. ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-epic-trial-epics-
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 162. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. In an attempt to expose a large tech corporation to antitrust 
liability, the Court has incentivized a contractual relationship that limits the competitiveness of the alleged 
antitrust victims. 
 163. Adi Robertson, How Apple’s Supreme Court Loss Could Change the Way You Buy Apps, THE VERGE, 
(May 14, 2019, 4:04pm EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18618127/apple-pepper-supreme-court-
loss-kavanaugh-opinion-app-store-antitrust-explainer-vergecast. 
 164. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 165. Id. at 1520. 
 166. See supra Section IV.A. 
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cause within congressionally ratified antitrust legislation.167 As the market for online 
console applications grows, the Court’s decision creates long term complications and 
injustices for software developers and retailers alike.168  
 
 167. See supra Section IV.B. 
 168. See supra Section IV.C. 
